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Forget semantics; Federal health policies that under-mine bulk billing and encourage ‘user-pays’ charging of patients 
for primary care move Australia  towards  a US- style health care system. They are expected to cost the health system 
more, not A$12 billion less, and under-mine Medicare’s bottom-line universal access equity, efficiency and health 
outcome objectives. 
 
Australia’s Medicare system enables universal free access for Australian citizens to necessary care and is key to satisfying 
underlying equity (universal access) and population health outcomes, but also health system efficiency objectives  [1].  The  
Australian practice of bulk billing allows patients free universal access to primary care, where general practitioners (GPs), 
allied health services and specialist health professionals accept the Medicare benefit (currently typically A$37.05 for a 
service) as full payment for a service and do not charge patients any copayment [2]. Bulk-billed patients cannot be charged 
for any other costs, such as booking, administration or record- keeping fees, or use of dressings and bandages. Currently, 
83.6 % of GP services are bulk billed [3]. 
 
The claim has been put forward prior to, during and after election-related Medicare debates that extension of the Australian 
Federal Liberal-National Coalition’s policy of not indexing GP, allied health service and other specialist bulk-billing 
payments would save A$2.4 billion over the next 4 years and A$12 billion over the next 10 years [4, 5]. However, 
empirical and theoretical health economic analysis of the Coalition’s recent policies and policy framework, with sustained 
attacks on bulk billing— charging patients for GP and allied health services either directly via mandatory copayments or 
indirectly by freezing bulk-billing payments—will cost the health system more, not less, over time [6–11]. 
 
The evidence internationally is clear that charges in primary care settings lead to reduced access for ‘at-need’ populations 
to primary care prevention, health promotion and treatment services, such as those provided by GPs, which leads to 
greater needs for, and use of, downstream services by those underserviced populations [12, 13]. However, this would also 
be expected to lead to overservicing of those who remain able to pay, with GPs inducing demand in such populations to 
help fill holes in the patient list and achieve the associated target income of their practices [14–16]. Hence, such policies 
move Australia towards the exact problems of a US-style user-pays health care system—underservicing of those who 
reduce their access for financial reasons, and overservicing of those who remain—with the associated higher health 
system costs and worse health outcomes that reduced equity leads to [17, 18]. 
 
In estimating the impacts of charging patients for primary care on those objectives, the best evidence internationally 
comes from the USA, where such policies have been used extensively, with strong empirical evidence of the impacts on 
primary care access, health system costs and patient access. Indeed, the evidence goes back to the 1970s, with analysis of 
the bottom-line impacts of introducing a US$1 Medicaid copayment in California and, more recently, 21st-century analysis 
of increasing charges for US Medicare patients (populations aged over 65 years) by about US$7 a visit [13, 14]. In 
terms of equity and universal access, this evidence points to reducing use of primary care services by at-need 
populations with the introduction of any charge, while increasing their need for, and use of, inpatient services [12, 13]. In 
California, in the 1970s, the US$1 copayment resulted in an overall 17 % increase in inpatient admissions, while there 
was an 8 % reduction in the rate of primary care physician visits [12]. In the 2000s, an average US$7 copayment increase 
for the elderly resulted in an additional inpatient stay for every nine out- patient services reduced, leading to a net increase 
in annual Medicare health expenditure of US$169, with a reduced outpatient cost of US$71 being more than offset by 
increased inpatient costs of US$240 [13]. That is, an additional three dollars and twenty cents was spent in more complex 
care for every dollar ‘saved’ in primary care—a result magnified in diabetes, hypertension, myocardial infarction and low-
socioeconomic populations. 
 
Hence, the claim of a A$12 billion saving to the Federal budget bottom line in Australia, by moving away from bulk billing in 
coercing GPs to charge patients, moves Australia towards a US-style user-pays system and would be expected to cost in 
the order of A$38 billion ($3.20 for every dollar ‘saved’) in downstream health costs, given US evidence. These 
downstream costs would not appear directly in the Federal health budget, which accounts only for the projected direct 
cost ‘savings’ in GP care, but are expected to impact overall negatively on the Federal and State budget bottom lines 
from downstream additional hospital use and costs. 
 
Given an additional A$3.20 in downstream costs for every dollar saved in GP payments—even if the Federal Government paid 
45 cents in every dollar for additional hospital activity cost, as expected under current Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) arrangements [19]—the net impact on the Federal budget would be expected to be negative overall. That is, the 
Federal budget would face funding equivalent to an extra A$1.44 spent (45 % of A$3.20) for every A$1 saved—in net terms, 
being A$5 billion worse off over  10  years,  with  A$17 billion  additional  downstream costs  to  the  Federal  budget  more  
than  offsetting  the A$12 billion GP ‘savings’. Additionally, State health budgets would be expected to be even worse off by 
A$21 billion over 10 years, given that they would be expected to face A$1.76 of additional hospital costs (55 % of A$3.20) 
for every A$1.00 ‘saved’ in Federal provision of GP services. Overall, the Australian Federal and State budgets (and the 
publicly funded health system) would be A$26 billion worse off over 10 years, while also imposing costs on patients, thereby 
undermining Medicare universal access, health out- comes and health system efficiency bottom-line objectives. 
 
In the USA, such bottom-line impacts of user-pays policies have been reflected in the most recent 2 013 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) analysis, where, despite spending more than 18 % of gross domestic 
product (GDP) on health expenditure (compared with an OECD average of 9 %), and more than US$8500 per capita, they 
had some of the worst health outcomes in terms of life expectancy currently or life expectancy improvement over the last 
50 years [17]. Indeed, the USA had worse life expectancy outcomes than all countries with health expenditure of more than 
US$2000 per capita. This is also reflected in a Common- wealth Fund comparison on the key bottom-line objectives of 
equity, efficiency and health outcomes across 11 first- world countries (including the USA and Australia), in which the USA 
came last (11th out of 11) on each of these health  system  objectives,  while  Australia  was  fourth overall and first in 
terms of efficiency [18]. 
 
It should be clear to health policy makers that health care services are not like other economic goods where Economics 
101-style modelling of quantity reduction and budget cost savings arise as impacts from user payments. Ideological 
rhetoric for user payments creating appropriate use and increasing efficiency—such as that underlying the various policies 
and proposals for undermining bulk billing and charging patients for primary care [4, 5, 20–22])—are diametrically opposed 
to what can be expected from such policies being applied to the Australian health care system. 
 
If the Coalition’s health policy reform is aimed at reducing supplier-induced demand (SID), it should be clear that charging 
patients is misguided and does not work to address this. Rather it results in underservicing and higher downstream costs 
in those who no longer access primary care, while GPs are expected to respond by inducing demand and overservicing 
populations who can still afford to pay. That is, GPs maintain their target incomes and fill the holes in their lists left by 
reduced use on the part of at- need populations not able to afford services, by increasingly overservicing those who remain 
able to. Such over- servicing can manifest in unnecessary tests, procedures and/or use of prescription medications. 
Importantly, like underservicing, such overservicing can also be expected to lead   to   adverse  health   effects   and   their   
subsequent increased downstream costs [14–16]. 
 
If policy reform really wants to tackle SID in GP and primary care settings, then a capitation-based system, where GPs 
are paid for the populations they service—such as the core primary care payments in the UK [23]—should be considered. 
In Australia’s case, such a policy could also be expected to address the skewed density of working GPs per 100,000 
population in urban regions (228/100,0000 compared with rural regions [145/100,000] or remote regions [113/100,000]) 
[24]. Reductions in the availability of bulk-billing doctors, with a continuing freeze on GP bulk-billing payments, can be 
expected to be greatest in rural and remote regions because of a lack of alternative local options and the high travel 
time/costs of ‘shopping around’ for bulk-billing services in these areas. 
 
Unless GP Medicare payments move from fee for service to capitation payments, bulk billing is the key feature that 
supports health system universal access, population health outcomes and efficiency; policies that undermine bulk billing 
(patient copayments or freezing bulk-billing payments to GPs) move us towards a more costly and less efficient US-style 
health care system. 
 
Alternatively, if the objective of Federal health policy reform is to improve the budget bottom line—without impacting on 
Medicare and health system equity, and health outcome objectives—then removal of the private health insurance rebate is 
the obvious reform. While now costing more than A$6 billion annually[4],  the private health insurance rebate has abjectly 
failed to meet the stated objective of taking pressure off the public health system. Cumulative evidence since the 
introduction of the rebate in 2000 suggests it has, in fact, placed net pressure on the public system [11, 25–27]. The private 
health insurance rebate, by reducing the threat of higher future premiums with lifetime cover, itself had little (or no) net 
impact on private health insurance rates despite reducing current premiums. However, increased health insurance rates 
attributable to threats of lifetime cover and Medicare levy surcharges, while having limited reduction in public patient 
hospital use for necessary care, have resulted in substantial increased private activity for unnecessary treatment, creating 
added wage pressure on the public system. So, removing the subsidy on private health insurance currently would not impact 
on access to necessary care or health outcomes, while saving the Commonwealth budget more than A$6 billion annually. 
 
In the short term, regardless of what arrangements for government are in place after the 2016 Federal election, current 
Federal health policies that attack access to primary care need to be reversed. GPs, whose income is currently being 
eroded, cannot indefinitely defend Medicare universal access, efficiency and health outcomes against the policy 
mechanisms moving Australia towards US-style user payments and poorer health outcomes. 
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